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32 Congenital aphantasia is a recently characterized variation of experience defined 
33 by the inability to form voluntary visual imagery, in individuals who are otherwise high 
34 performing. Because of this specific deficit to visual imagery, individuals with aphantasia 
35 serve as an ideal group for probing the nature of representations in visual memory, 
36 particularly the interplay of object, spatial, and symbolic information. Here, we 
37 conducted a large-scale online study of aphantasia and revealed a dissociation in object 
38 and spatial content in their memory representations. Sixty-one individuals with 
39 aphantasia and matched controls with typical imagery studied real-world scene images, 
40 and were asked to draw them from memory, and then later copy them during a matched 
41 perceptual condition. Drawings were objectively quantified by 2,795 online scorers for 
42 object and spatial details. Aphantasic participants  recalled significantly fewer objects 
43 than controls, with less color in their drawings, and an increased reliance on verbal 
44 scaffolding. However, aphantasic participants showed high spatial accuracy equivalent 
45 to controls, and made significantly fewer memory errors. These differences between 
46 groups only manifested during recall, with no differences between groups during the 
47 matched perceptual condition. This object-specific memory impairment in individuals 
48 with aphantasia provides evidence for separate systems in memory that support object 
49 versus spatial information. The study also provides an important experimental validation 
50 for the existence of aphantasia as a variation in human imagery experience. 
51





57 Visual imagery, the ability to form visual mental representations of objects or 
58 scenes that are not physically in front of us, is a common human cognitive experience, 
59 which has been difficult to characterize and quantify. What is the nature of the images 
60 that come to mind when forming mental representations of absent items, and are these 
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61 even visual in nature? What might these representations look like if one lacks visual 
62 imagery? Aphantasia is a recently characterized variation in experience, defined by an 
63 inability to create voluntary visual mental images, although semantic memory and vision 
64 is reported to remain intact (Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 2015; Keogh & Pearson, 
65 2018). Aphantasia is still largely uncharacterized, with many of its studies based on 
66 case studies or employing small samples of individuals with congenital aphantasia 
67 (Zeman et al., 2015; Keogh & Pearson, 2018; Jacobs, Schwarzkopf, & Silvanto, 2018; 
68 Brons, 2019; Dawes, Keogh, Andrillon & Pearson, 2020), with few case studies of 
69 acquired aphantasia (e.g. Zeman et al., 2010; see also, Botez, Olivier, Vezina, Botez & 
70 Kaufman, 1985). Here, using an online crowd-sourced drawing task designed to 
71 quantify the content of visual memories (Bainbridge, Hall, & Baker, 2019), we examine 
72 the nature of aphantasics’ mental representations of visual stimuli within a large sample, 
73 and reveal differences in behavior for object and spatial imagery. 
74 Although a first study describes individuals with an absence of mental imagery in 
75 the 19th century (Galton, 1880), the variation in experience has only recently been 
76 defined and named as aphantasia, and there has been very little formal investigation, 
77 with only six published studies (Zeman et al., 2015; Keogh & Pearson, 2018; Jacobs et 
78 al., 2018; Brons, 2019; Dawes et al., 2020; Zeman et al., 2020). This is arguably 
79 because most individuals with aphantasia can lead functional, ordinary lives, with many 
80 individuals realizing their imagery experience differed from the majority only in 
81 adulthood. The current method for identifying if an individual has aphantasia is through 
82 subjective self-report, using the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks, 
83 1973). However, recent research has begun quantifying the experience using objective 
84 measures such as priming during binocular rivalry (Keogh & Pearson, 2018) and skin 
85 conductance during reading (Wicken et al., Unpublished results). Since its identification, 
86 several prominent figures have come forth describing their experience with aphantasia, 
87 including physicist Nicholas Watkins (Watkins, 2018), Firefox co-creator Blake Ross 
88 (Ross, 2016), and Ed Catmull, co-founder of Pixar and recently retired president of Walt 
89 Disney Animation Studios (Gallagher, 2019), leading to broader recognition of the 
90 experience. 
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91 Like prosopagnosia (Behrmann & Avidan, 2005), aphantasia is considered to be 
92 congenital in the majority of cases, because participants report that they have always 
93 experienced a lack of imagery (although it can also be acquired through trauma; Zeman 
94 et al., 2010; Thorudottir et al., 2020). A single-participant aphantasia case study found 
95 no significant difference from controls in a visual imagery task (judging the location of a 
96 target in relation to an imagined shape) nor its matched version of a working memory 
97 task, except at the hardest level of difficulty (Jacobs et al., 2018). However, individuals 
98 with aphantasia show significantly less imagery-based priming in a binocular rivalry task 
99 (Keogh & Pearson, 2018; Pearson, 2019), and show diminished physiological 
100 responses to fearful text as compared with controls (Wicken et al., Unpublished results). 
101 A recent self-report study has shown that individuals with aphantasia experience less 
102 rich autobiographical memories, with some but not all reporting decreased imagery in 
103 other sensory domains (Dawes et al., 2020; Zeman et al., 2020).  While these studies 
104 have observed differences between individuals with aphantasia and controls, the nature 
105 of aphantasics’ mental representations during visual recall is still unknown. 
106 Understanding these differences in representation between individuals with aphantasia 
107 and controls could shed light on broader questions of what information (visual, spatial, 
108 symbolic) makes up a memory, and how this information compares to the initial 
109 perceptual trace. As individuals with aphantasia are selectively impaired only with 
110 imagery but not perception, this suggests perception and imagery do not reply upon 
111 identical neural substrates and representations (Dijkstra, Bosch, & van Gerven, 2019). 
112 Although this does not exclude the possibility of some overlap in the two processes, this 
113 acts as further evidence towards a growing body of work demonstrating key differences 
114 between imagery and perception (Lee, Kravitz, & Baker, 2012; Favila, Lee, & Kuhl, 
115 2020; Bainbridge, Hall, & Baker, 2020). Examination into aphantasia thus has wide-
116 reaching potential implications for the understanding of the way we form mental 
117 representations of our world.
118 The nature and content of our visual imagery has proven very difficult to quantify. 
119 Several studies in psychology have developed tasks to objectively study the cognitive 
120 process of mental imagery through visual working memory or priming (e.g., Marmor & 
121 Zaback, 1976; Keogh & Pearson 2011). The difficulty in objectively quantifying the 
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122 imagery experience led to a long-standing debate within the imagery literature over the 
123 nature of images, and specifically whether visual imagery representations are depictive 
124 and picture-like in nature (Kosslyn, 1980; Kosslyn 2005) or symbolic, “propositional” 
125 representations (Pylyshyn, 1981; Pylyshyn, 2003). Neuropsychological research, 
126 especially in neuroimaging, has led to large leaps in our understanding of visual 
127 imagery. Studies examining the role and activation of the primary visual cortex during 
128 imagery tasks have been interpreted as supporting the depictive nature of imagery 
129 (Ishai, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000; Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001; Schacter et al., 
130 2012; Pearson & Kosslyn, 2015). However, neuropsychological studies have identified 
131 patients with dissociable impairments in perception versus imagery (Behrmann, 2000; 
132 Bartolomeo, 2008), and recent neuroimaging work has suggested there may be 
133 systematically related yet separate cortical areas for perception and imagery, and that 
134 the neural representation during imagery may lack much of the richer, elaborative 
135 processing of the initial perceptual trace (Lee et al., 2012; Xiao et al., 2017; Silson et al., 
136 2019; Favila, et al., 2020; Bainbridge, Hall, & Baker, 2020). Combined with research 
137 identifying situations where propositional encoding dominates spatial imagery (e.g., 
138 Stevens & Coupe, 1978), researchers have concluded that there is a role for both 
139 propositional and depictive elements in the imagery process (e.g., Denis & Cocude, 
140 1989). In their case study, Jacobs and colleagues (2018) argue that differences in 
141 performance between aphantasic participant AI and neurotypical controls may result 
142 from different strategies, including a heavier reliance on propositional encoding, relying 
143 on a spatial or verbal code. Thus, ideally a task that measures both depictive (visual) 
144 and propositional (symbolic) elements of a mental representation could directly compare 
145 the strategies used by aphantasic and control participants. In a recent study, impressive 
146 levels of both object and spatial detail could be quantified by drawings made by 
147 neurotypical adults in a drawing-based visual memory experiment (Bainbridge et al., 
148 2019). The amount of detail included in these memory drawings far surpassed the 
149 amount of detail recalled in a matched verbal memory task, suggesting that this drawing 
150 task specifically taps into visual mental representations of an item. Such drawings allow 
151 a more direct look at the information within one’s mental representation of a visual 
152 image, in contrast to verbal descriptions or recognition-based tasks. Thus, a drawing 
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153 task may allow us to identify what fundamental differences exist between individuals 
154 with aphantasia and typical imagery, and in turn inform us of what information exists 
155 within imagery.
156 In the current study, we examine the visual memory representations of 
157 individuals with congenital aphantasia and typical imagery (controls) for real-world 
158 scene images. Through online crowd-sourcing, we leverage the power of the internet to 
159 identify and recruit large numbers of both aphantasic (VVIQ ≤ 25) and controls ( ≥ 40) 
160 for a memory drawing task. We also recruit over 2,700 online scorers to objectively 
161 quantify these drawings for object details, spatial details, and errors in the drawings. We 
162 discover a selective impairment in aphantasic participants for object memory, with 
163 significantly fewer visual details and evidence for increased verbal scaffolding. In 
164 contrast, for the items that they remember, aphantasic participants  show spatial 
165 accuracy at the same high level of precision as controls. Aphantasic participants  also 
166 show fewer memory errors and memory correction as compared to controls. These 
167 results add to a growing body evidence for two separate systems that support object 
168 information versus spatial information in memory. 
169
170 2. Materials and Methods
171
172 2.1 Participants
173 N=123 adults participated in the main online drawing recall experiment, while 
174 2,795 adults participated in online scoring experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
175 (AMT) of the drawings from the main experiment. Aphantasic participants for the main 
176 experiment were recruited from aphantasia-specific online forums, including 
177 “Aphantasia (Non-Imager/Mental Blindness) Awareness Group”, “Aphantasia!” and 
178 Aphantasia discussion pages on Reddit. Control participants for the main experiment 
179 were recruited from the population at the University of Westminster, online social media 
180 sites such as Facebook and Twitter pages for the University of Westminster 
181 Psychology, and “Participate in research” pages on Reddit. Scoring participants were 
182 recruited from the general population of AMT.
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183 Participant group membership was confirmed by their score on the Vividness of 
184 Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ), a self-report measure of the vividness of one’s 
185 visual mental images (Marks, 1973). Scores on the VVIQ range from 16 to 80. Although 
186 aphantasia is currently determined by scores on the VVIQ (e.g., Zeman et al., 2015; 
187 Jacobs et al., 2017; Dawes et al., 2020; Zeman et al., 2020), there is currently no 
188 agreed cut-off to classify an experience as aphantasic or not. Some studies have used 
189 a cut off of 32 (e.g. Dawes et al., 2020; Wicken et al., Unpublished Results). Recently 
190 others have begun to take a more conservative approach in an attempt to distinguish 
191 between the extreme of aphantasia (no imagery experience) and self-reports of limited 
192 imagery experience (e.g. Zeman et al., 2020). Where it is addressed at all, classification 
193 of “typical” imagery experience also varies within aphantasic research (Keogh & 
194 Pearson 2017; Zeman et al., 2020). The VVIQ was not developed as a clinical tool, and 
195 as such there is limited normative date on “normal” imagery experience in the general 
196 population. In a meta-analysis, McKelvie (1995) suggested that the population mean 
197 VVIQ was 59.2 (SD = 11.07). He also identified a low-imagery group, for whom the 
198 mean score was 49.6 (SD = 9.04). In this study, aphantasia was defined by VVIQ 
199 scores ≤ 25 (M = 16.87, SD = 2.16), a particularly conservative cut-off to ensure we 
200 were specifically studying those with incredibly low imagery. Control participants had 
201 VVIQ scores ≥ 40 (M = 60.10, SD = 8.62), which are in line with the mean VVIQ scores 
202 found within the meta-anlysis of ‘normal’ imagery experience (McKelvie, 1995). Eight 
203 participants were removed from the analyses for having scores between 26 and 39. 
204 Some participants skipped questions in the VVIQ, likely due to mis-clicks on the online 
205 interface or fatigue at the end of the experiment. Two participants skipped over 25% of 
206 the questions on the VVIQ, and were removed from the analyses. Of the remaining 
207 aphantasic participants, four skipped one question, one skipped two questions, and one 
208 skipped three questions. Of the remaining control participants, five skipped one 
209 question, and one skipped three questions. None of these small errors were enough to 
210 change the group membership of these participants (regardless of how they might have 
211 answered these questions), and their data were retained for the analyses. There were 
212 61 aphantasic and 52 control participants in total for the final analyses. 
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213 No personally identifiable information was collected from any participants, and 
214 participants had to acknowledge participation in order to continue, following the 
215 guidelines approved by the University of Westminster Psychology Ethics Committee 
216 (ETH1718-2345) and the National Institutes of Health Office of Human Subjects 
217 Research Protections (18-NIMH-00696).
218
219 2.2 Main Experiment: Drawing Recall Experiment
220 The Drawing Recall Experiment was a fully online memory experiment that 
221 consisted of five sections ordered: 1) study phase, 2) recall drawing phase, 3) 
222 recognition phase, 4) copied drawing (perception) phase, and 5) questionnaires and 
223 demographics. The methods of the experiment are summarized in Fig. 1. The 
224 experiment was programmed in a standard text editor, using HTML, Javascript, and 
225 CSS, and participant submissions were saved to a web server using PHP and a MySQL 
226 server-side database. Participants saw the experiment as a standard web page. The 
227 drawing tool was adapted from open source Javascript plugin wPaint 
228 (http://wpaint.websanova.com/). All code and drawing data, as well as a tutorial on how 
229 to code similar online experiments from the ground up, can be downloaded from the 
230 Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/cahyd/).
231
232
1 - Study Images
10 s per image
2 - Memory Drawing 3 - Recognition Test
Unlimited time Category-matched foils:




(Draw each image frommemory) (Copy each image while viewing)
Unlimited time
233 Fig. 1. The experimental design of the online experiment. Participants 1) studied three separate 
234 scene photographs presented sequentially, 2) drew them from memory, 3) completed a recognition 
235 task, 4) copied the images while viewing them, and then 5) filled out the VVIQ and OSIQ 




239 First, for the study phase, participants were told to study three images in as much 
240 detail as possible. The images were presented at 500 x 500 pixels. They were shown 
241 each image for 10 s, presented in a randomized order with a 1 s interstimulus interval 
242 (ISI). These three images (see Fig 1a) were selected from a previously validated 
243 memory drawing study (Bainbridge et al., 2019), as the images with the highest recall 
244 success, highest number of objects, and several unique elements compared to a 
245 canonical representation of its category. For example, the kitchen scene does not 
246 include several typical kitchen components such as a refrigerator, microwave, or stove, 
247 and does include more idiosyncratic objects such as a ceramic chef, zebra-printed 
248 chairs, and a ceiling fan. This is important as we want to assess the ability to recall 
249 unique visual information beyond just a coding of the category name (e.g., just drawing 
250 a typical kitchen). Participants were not informed what they would do after studying the 
251 images, to prevent targeted memory strategies.
252 Second, the recall drawing phase tested what visual memory representations 
253 participants had for these images through drawing. Participants were presented with a 
254 blank square with the same dimensions as the original images and told to draw an 
255 image from memory in as much detail as possible using their mouse. Participants drew 
256 using an interface like a simple paint program. They could draw with a pen in multiple 
257 colors, erase lines, and undo or redo actions. They were given unlimited time and could 
258 draw the images in any order. They were also instructed that they could write labels for 
259 any unclear items (e.g., indicate that a specific scribble is a chair). Once a participant 
260 finished a drawing, they then moved onto another blank square to start a new drawing. 
261 They were asked to create three drawings from memory, and could not go back to edit 
262 previous drawings. As they were drawing, their mouse movements were recorded to 
263 track timing and erasing behavior. These drawings were later quantified by online 
264 scorers in a series of separate experiments (see Section 2.3 below).
265 Third, the recognition phase tested whether there was visual recognition memory 
266 for these specific images. Participants viewed images and were told to indicate whether 
267 they had seen each image before or not. The images consisted of the three images 
268 presented in the study phase as well as three new foil images of the same scene 
269 categories (kitchen, bedroom, living room). Matched foils were used so that recognition 
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270 performance could not rely on recognizing the category type alone. All images were 
271 presented at 500 x 500 pixels. Participants were given unlimited time to view the image 
272 and respond, and a fixation cross appeared between each image for 200 ms.
273 Fourth, the copied drawing phase had participants copy the drawings while 
274 viewing them, in order to see how participants perceive each image in the absence of a 
275 memory task. This phase provides an estimate of the participant’s drawing ability and 
276 ability to use this drawing interface with a computer mouse to create drawings. This 
277 phase also measures the maximum information one might draw for a given image (e.g., 
278 you won’t draw every plate stacked in a cupboard). Participants saw each image from 
279 the study phase presented next to a blank square. They were instructed to copy the 
280 image in as much detail as possible, resulting in a “perception drawing”. The blank 
281 square used the same interface as the recall drawing phase. When they were done, 
282 they could continue onto the next image, until they copied all three images from the 
283 study phase. The images were tested in a random order, and participants had as much 
284 time as they wanted to draw each image, but could not go back to any completed 
285 drawings. 
286 Finally, participants filled out three questionnaires at the end. They completed the 
287 previously mentioned VVIQ (Marks, 1973), which was mainly used to determine 
288 participant group membership. Participants also completed the more recent Object and 
289 Spatial Imagery Questionnaire (OSIQ) (Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, & Motes, 2006), 
290 which measures visual imagery preference for object information and spatial 
291 information, providing a score between 15-75 for each subscore (object, spatial). 
292 Finally, participants provided basic demographics, basic information about their 
293 computer interface, and their experience with art. In these final questions, they indicated 
294 which component of the experiment was most difficult, and were able to write comments 
295 on why they found it difficult.
296
297 2.3 Online Scoring Experiments
298 In order to objectively and rapidly score the 655 drawings produced in the 
299 Drawing Recall Experiment, we conducted online crowd-sourced scoring experiments 
300 with a set of 2,795  participants on AMT, an online platform used for crowd-sourcing of 
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301 tasks. None of these participants took part in the Drawing Recall Experiment. For all 
302 online scoring experiments, scorers could participate in as many trials as they wanted, 
303 and were compensated for their time. Scorers did not know the nature or origin of the 
304 drawings; they did not know these drawings related to a study of aphantasia and that 
305 the drawings came from different groups of people.
306 2.3.1 Object Selection Study
307 AMT scorers were asked to indicate which objects from the original images were 
308 in each drawing. This allows us to systematically measure how many and what types of 
309 objects exist in the drawings. They were presented with one drawing and five 
310 photographs of the original image with a different object highlighted in red. They had to 
311 click on all object images that were contained in the original drawing. Five scorers were 
312 recruited per object, with 909 unique scorers in total. An object was determined to exist 
313 in the drawing if at least 3 out of 5 scorers selected it.
314 2.3.2 Object Location Study
315 For each object, AMT scorers were asked to place and resize an oval around 
316 that object in the drawing, in order to get information on the location and size accuracy 
317 of the objects in the drawings. AMT scorers were instructed on which object to circle in 
318 the drawing by the original image with the object highlighted in red, and only objects 
319 selected in the Object Selection Study were used. Five scorers were recruited per 
320 object, with 1,310 unique scorers in total. Object location and size (in both the x and y 
321 directions) were taken as the median pixel values across the five scorers. 
322 2.3.3 Object Details Study
323 AMT scorers indicated what details existed in the specific drawings. In a first 
324 AMT experiment, five scorers per object (N=304 total) saw each object from the original 
325 images and were asked to list 5 unique traits about the object (e.g., shape, material, 
326 pattern, style). A list of unique traits was then created for each object in the images. In a 
327 second AMT experiment, scorers were then shown each object in the drawings 
328 (highlighted by the ellipse drawn in the Object Location Study), and had to indicate 
329 whether that trait described the drawn object or not. Five scorers were recruited per trait 
330 per drawn object, with 777 unique scorers in total.
331 2.3.4 False Objects Study
12
332 AMT scorers were asked to indicate “false objects” in the drawings—what objects 
333 were drawn in the drawing that didn’t exist in the original image? Scorers were shown a 
334 drawing and its corresponding image and were asked to write down a list of all false 
335 objects. Nine scorers were recruited per drawing, with 337 unique scorers in total. An 
336 object was counted as a false object if at least three scorers listed it.
337
338 2.4 Additional Drawing Scoring Metrics and Analyses
339 In addition to the Online Scoring Experiments (Section 2.3), other attributes were 
340 collected for the drawings. A blind scorer (the corresponding author) viewed each 
341 drawing presented in a random order (without participant or condition information 
342 visible) and coded yes or no for if the drawing 1) contained any color, 2) contained any 
343 text, and 3) contained any erasures. Erasures were quantified by viewing the mouse 
344 movements used for drawing the image, to see if lines were drawn and then erased, 
345 and did not make it into the final image. 
346 Throughout this manuscript, whenever parametric statistical tests were used to 
347 compare groups, we first confirmed the measures were not significantly different from a 




352 With these memory and perceptual drawings, we can then make direct 
353 comparisons in the types of detail, amounts of detail, and types of errors that may differ 
354 between aphantasic and control participants . First, we examine the demographic 
355 measures between the two groups, such as age, gender, art ability, and ratings on the 
356 OSIQ. Second, we turn to objective quantification of the drawings, and explore 
357 differences in the objects drawn by aphantasic and control participants  and text-based 
358 strategies. Third, we compare spatial accuracy in the drawings between these two 
359 groups. Finally, we compare the presence of memory errors, quantifying the number of 
360 falsely inserted additional objects.
361
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362 3.1 No demographic differences between groups, but reported differences in 
363 object and spatial imagery
364 First, we analyzed whether there were demographic differences between the 
365 groups. There was a significant difference in age between groups with aphantasic 
366 participants   generally older than controls (aphantasic: M=41.88 years, SD=13.88, 
367 Range=18 to 74 years; control: M=32.12 years, SD=15.26, Range=18 to 75 years; 
368 t(107)=3.49, p=6.95 × 10-4). To ensure the effects we report are not simply due to age 
369 differences, we also ran all of the following analyses using a sub-sampled set of 
370 aphantasic and control participants with matched age distributions (Supplementary 
371 Material 1). All main results replicated even when controlling for age, indicating that the 
372 results reported in this manuscript are due to imagery differences, and not age 
373 differences between groups. There was no significant difference in gender proportion 
374 between the two groups (aphantasic: 62.3% female; control: 59.6% female; Pearson’s 
375 chi-square test for proportions: χ2=0.08, p=0.771), even though a previous study 
376 reported a sample comprising of predominantly males (Zeman et al., 2015). 
377 Second, we investigated the relationship of the VVIQ score and OSIQ (Fig. 2), a 
378 questionnaire developed to separate abilities to perform imagery with individual objects 
379 versus spatial relations amongst objects (Blajenkova et al., 2006). Controls scored 
380 significantly higher on the OSIQ than aphantasic participants  (t(103) = 12.70, p=8.55 × 
381 10-23, effect size Cohen’s d=2.48). There was a significant correlation between VVIQ 
382 score and OSIQ score for control participants (M=89.73, SD=10.97; Spearman rank-
383 correlation test: ρ=0.54, p=7.70 × 10-5), but only marginally for aphantasic participants  
384 (OSIQ M score=62.88, SD=10.65; ρ=0.26, p=0.052). When broken down by OSIQ 
385 subscale, there was a significant difference between groups in questions relating to 
386 object imagery (t(103)=20.00, p=3.01 × 10-37, d=3.80), but not spatial imagery (t(103)=-
387 0.33, p=0.742). Indeed, a 2-way ANOVA (participant group × subscale) reveals a main 
388 effect of participant group (F(1,206)=154.97, p~0, effect size ηp2=0.43), subscale 
389 (F(1,206)=40.11, p=1.48 × 10-9, ηp2=0.16), and a significant interaction 
390 (F(1,206)=167.94, p~0, ηp2=0.45), confirming a difference in self-reported ratings for 
391 object imagery and spatial imagery respectively. This difference in self-reported object 
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392 imagery and spatial imagery has been reported a previous study (Keogh & Pearson, 
393 2018), and suggests a potential difference between the two imagery subsystems.
394
395
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396 Figure 2. Experimental paradigm and basic demographics. a) b) (Left) A histogram of the 
397 distribution of participants across the VVIQ. Aphantasic participants  were selected as those 
398 scoring 25 and below (N=61) and controls were selected as those scoring 40 and above (N=52), 
399 while those in between were removed from the analyses (N=8). While the range of the VVIQ is from 
400 16 to 80, some participants (N=10 out of 121 total) skipped 1-3 questions, leading to some 
401 participants scoring below 16. These skipped questions did not affect group membership. (Middle) A 
402 scatterplot of total VVIQ score plotted against total OSIQ Object component score for participants 
403 meeting criterion. Each point represents a participant, with aphantasic participants in blue and 
404 controls in red. There was a significant difference in OSIQ Object score between the two groups. 
405 (Right) A scatterplot of total VVIQ score plotted against OSIQ Spatial component score. There was 
406 no difference in OSIQ Spatial score between the two groups. Both the OSIQ Object component and 
407 Spatial components have a range of 15 to 75 points.
408
409 Third, we investigated whether aphantasic and control participants reported 
410 different levels of comfort or familiarity with art, which may influence their drawing 
411 performance. When asked to rate their artistic abilities on a scale from 1 (very poor) to 5 
412 (very good), aphantasic and control participants showed no significant difference in their 
413 ratings (aphantasic: M=2.30, SD=1.34; control: M=2.52, SD=0.99; non-parametric 
414 Wilcoxon rank sum test: Z=1.23, p=0.219). Both aphantasic and control participants 
415 also reported taking art classes in the past (39.34% of aphantasic participants, 37.74% 
416 of controls). When asked to list occupation, many aphantasic participants (13.11%) 
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417 reported being employed within industries involving artistic abilities, such as sculpting, 
418 visual arts, makeup art, and interior decoration. In contrast, surprisingly none of the 
419 control participants reported being employed in artistic fields (instead with occupations 
420 such as software developer, patent attorney, librarian, sales associate). That being said, 
421 these occupational differences should not be over-interpreted as we did not explicitly 
422 aim to sample a broad set of occupations. However, overall, aphantasic and control 
423 participants in the current sample did not show strong differences in their propensity for, 
424 or interest in, art.
425 Finally, given the focus of the current experiment on visual recall, we also 
426 compared measures of visual recognition performance. Both groups performed near 
427 ceiling at visual recognition of the images they studied, with no significant difference 
428 between groups in recognition hit rate (control: M=0.96, SD=0.12; aphantasic: M=0.97, 
429 SD=0.12; Wilcoxon rank-sum test: Z=1.09, p=0.274), or false alarm rate (control: 
430 M=0.02, SD=0.12; aphantasic: M=0, SD=0; Wilcoxon rank-sum test: Z=1.10, p=0.273). 
431 These results indicate that there is no evidence for a deficit in aphantasic participants 
432 for recognizing images within this element of the task, even with lures from the same 
433 semantic scene category. That being said, this recognition task may not have been 
434 challenging enough to highlight potential underlying differences between groups.
435
436 3.2 Diminished object information for aphantasics
437 Next, we turned to analyzing the drawings made by the participants to reveal 
438 objective measures of the mental representations of these two groups. Looking at 
439 overall number of drawings made, while a small number of participants could not recall 
440 all three images, there was no significant difference between groups in number of 
441 images drawn from memory (control: M=2.92, SD=0.27; aphantasic: M=2.89, SD=0.37; 










445 Figure 3. Example drawings. Example drawings made by aphantasic and control participants from 
446 memory and perception (i.e., copying the image) showing the range of performance. The memory 
447 and perception drawings connected by arrows are from the same participant, and every row is from 
448 a different participant. Low memory examples show participants who drew the fewest from memory 
449 but the most from perception. High memory examples show participants who drew the highest 
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450 amounts of detail from both memory and perception. These examples are all circled in the 
451 scatterplot of Fig. 4. The key question is whether there are meaningful differences between these 
452 two sets of participants’ drawings.
453
454 To score level of object information, AMT workers (N=5 per object) identified 
455 whether each of the objects in an image was present in each drawing of that image (Fig. 
456 4). A 2-way ANOVA of participant group (aphantasic / control) × drawing type (memory / 
457 perception drawing, repeated measure) looking at number of objects drawn per image 
458 showed no significant overall effect of participant group (F(1,223)=0.26, p=0.613), but a 
459 significant effect of drawing type (F(1,223)=507.03, p~0, ηp2=0.82), and more 
460 importantly, a significant statistical interaction (F(1,223)=9.25, p=0.0029, ηp2=0.08). 
461 Targeted post-hoc independent t-tests revealed that when drawing from memory, 
462 controls drew significantly more objects (M=6.32 objects per image, SD=3.07) than 
463 aphantasic participants (M=4.98, SD=2.54; t(111)=2.53, p=0.013, d=0.47) across the 
464 experiment. In contrast, when copying a drawing (perception drawing), aphantasic 
465 participants on average drew more objects from the images than controls, but with no 
466 significant difference (control: M=18.00 objects per image, SD=5.81; aphantasic: 
467 M=20.07, SD=7.26; t(111)=1.74, p=0.085). These results suggest that aphantasic 
































































472 Figure 4. Comparison of object information in drawings between aphantasic and control 
473 participants. (Left) A scatterplot of each participant as a point, showing average number of objects 
474 drawn from memory across the three images (x-axis), versus average number of objects drawn from 
475 perception across the three images (y-axis). Aphantasic participants are in blue, while control 
476 participants are in red. The bright blue circle indicates average aphantasic performance, while the 
477 bright red circle indicates average control performance, with crosshairs for both indicating standard 
478 error of the mean for memory and perception respectively. Histograms on the axes show the number 
479 of participants who drew each number of objects. Controls drew significantly more objects from 
480 memory, although with a tendency towards fewer from perception. The circled light blue and red 
481 points are the participants with the lowest memory performance shown in Fig. 3, while the circled 
482 dark blue and red points are the participants with the highest memory performance shown in Fig. 3. 
483 (Right) Heatmaps of which objects for each image tended to be drawn more by controls (red) or 
484 aphantasic participants (blue). Pixel value represents the proportion of control participants who drew 
485 that object in the image subtracted by the proportion of aphantasic participants who drew that object 
486 (with a range of -1 to 1). Controls remembered more objects (i.e., there is more red in the memory 
487 heatmaps), even though aphantasic participants tended to copy more objects (i.e., there is more 
488 blue in the perception heatmaps).
489
490 Given that some participants tended to draw few objects even when copying from 
491 an image, we also investigated a corrected measure, taken as the number of objects 
492 drawn from memory divided by the number of objects drawn from perception, for each 
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493 image for each participant. Drawings from perception with fewer than 5 objects were not 
494 included in the analysis, to remove any low-effort trials. Aphantasic participants drew a 
495 significantly smaller proportion of objects from memory than control participants 
496 (aphantasic: M=0.261, SD=0.165; control: M=0.369, SD=0.162; Wilcoxon rank-sum test: 
497 Z=4.09, p=4.24 × 10-5, effect size r=0.39). We also investigated the correlation within 
498 groups between the number of objects drawn from memory and the number drawn from 
499 perception. There was a significant correlation for both groups, where the more one 
500 draws from perception, the more one also tends to draw from memory (Pearson 
501 correlation; aphantasic: r=0.34, p=0.0075; control: r=0.40, p=0.0035). We also assessed 
502 the relationship between performance in the task and self-reported object imagery in the 
503 OSIQ. Across groups, there was a significant correlation between proportion of objects 
504 drawn from memory and OSIQ object score (Spearman’s rank correlation: ρ=0.33, 
505 p=7.18 × 10-4), although these correlations were not significant when separated by 
506 participant group (p>0.10). 
507 Next, we examined whether there was a difference in visual detail within objects, 
508 by quantifying differences between groups in color and amount of time spent on the 
509 drawings. Significantly more memory drawings by controls contained color than those 
510 by aphantasic participants (control: 38.2%, aphantasic: 21.6%; Pearson’s chi-square 
511 test for proportions: χ2=10.09, p=0.0015, effect size φ=0.18), while there was no 
512 significant difference for perception drawings (control: 46.2%, aphantasic: 39.4%, 
513 χ2=1.46, p=0.227). Control participants also spent significantly longer time on their 
514 memory drawings than aphantasic participants (control: M= 119.41 s per image, 
515 SD=68.88 s; aphantasic: M=71.22 s, SD=49.17 s; t(110) = 4.31, p=3.56 × 10-5, d=0.81). 
516 For the perception drawings, there was no significant difference between groups in the 
517 amount of time they spent on their drawings (control: M=272.33 s, SD=214.17 s; 
518 aphantasic: M=295.18 s, SD=304.54 s; p=0.654). These differences in time spent on 
519 memory drawing could reflect controls spending more time because they drew more 
520 objects from memory. However, even if we normalize total drawing time by number of 
521 objects drawn to get an estimate of average time spent per object, controls spent 
522 significantly more time per object than aphantasic participants when drawing from 
523 memory (Wilcoxon rank sum test: Z=2.09, p=0.037, r=0.20), but not when drawing 
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524 during perception (Z=0.75, p=0.454). This implies that aphantasic participants not only 
525 spent less time per drawing, but also less time on the details for each object. Finally, we 
526 investigated other forms of object detail, by having AMT workers (N=777) judge whether 
527 different object descriptors (e.g., material, texture, shape, aesthetics; generated by 304 
528 separate AMT workers) applied to each drawn object. This task did not identify 
529 differences between groups for the memory drawings (t(110)=0.21, p=0.833), although 
530 objects were significantly more detailed when copied than when drawn from memory for 
531 both aphantasic (memory: M=42.4% descriptors per object applied, SD=5.1%; copied: 
532 M=45.9%, SD=4.1%; t(119)=4.12, p=6.92 × 10-5, d=0.76) and control participants 
533 (memory: M=42.2%, SD=5.6%; copied: M=47.0%, SD=3.9%; t(100)=5.06, p=1.92 × 10-
534 6, d=0.99). However, it is possible this task may have required information that was too 
535 fine-grained than could be measured from these drawings (e.g., judging the material 
536 and texture of a drawn chair).
537 In sum, these results present concrete evidence that aphantasic recall fewer 
538 objects than control participants, and these objects contain less visual detail (i.e., color, 
539 less time spent for drawing) within their memory representations. 
540
541 3.3 Aphantasics show greater dependence on symbolic representations
542 While aphantasic participants show decreased object information in their memory 
543 drawings, they are still able to successfully draw some objects from memory (4.98 
544 objects per image on average). Do these drawings reveal evidence for alternative, non-
545 visual strategies that may have supported this level of performance? To test this 
546 question, we quantified the amount of text used to label objects included in the 
547 participants’ drawings. Note that while labeling was allowed (the instructions stated: 
548 “Please draw or label anything you are able to remember”), it was effortful as it required 
549 drawing the letters with the mouse. We found that significantly more memory drawings 
550 by aphantasic participants contained text than those by control participants (aphantasic: 
551 29.6%, control: 16.0%; χ2=7.57, p=0.0059, φ=0.16). Further, there was no significant 
552 difference between groups for perception drawings (aphantasic: 2.9%, control: 0.8%; 
553 χ2=1.77, p=0.184). These results imply that aphantasic participants may have relied 
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554 upon symbolic representations (Pylyshyn, 1981), rather than pictoral, to support their 
555 memory.
556 One question is whether aphantasic participants just prefer writing over drawing, 
557 and so prioritized time or effort on writing text over drawing objects. To elaborate, it is 
558 possible that aphantasic participants expend their effort on writing text, and then do not 
559 want to spend further time on drawing objects even if they might have object information 
560 in memory. If this were the case, then drawings that contain text should contain fewer 
561 objects. However, we found there was no significant difference in number of objects 
562 between aphantasic memory drawings with text and without (independent samples t-
563 test by drawing: t(174)=0.07, p=0.947). There was also no significant difference for their 
564 drawings made during perception (t(171)=0.35, p=0.726), nor were there differences for 
565 controls (memory drawings: t(150)=0.004, p=0.997; perception drawings: t(152)=1.50, 
566 p=0.135). These results indicate that the usage of text was not a trade-off with object 
567 memory; aphantasic participants preferred to include text in their memory drawings 
568 regardless of how many objects they recalled.
569 Comments by aphantasic participants at the end of the experiment supported 
570 their use of symbolic strategies. When asked what they thought was difficult about the 
571 task, one participant noted, “Because I don’t have any images in my head, when I was 
572 trying to remember the photos, I have to store the pieces as words. I always have to 
573 draw from reference photos.” Another aphantasic stated, “I had to remember a list of 
574 objects rather than the picture,” and another said, “When I saw the images, I described 
575 them to myself and drew from that description, so I… could only hold 7-9 details in 
576 memory.” In contrast, control participants largely commented on their lack of confidence 
577 in their drawing abilities: e.g., “I am very uncoordinated so making things look right was 
578 frustrating”; “I can see the picture in my mind, but I am terrible at drawing.” 
579
580 3.4 Aphantasics and controls show equally high spatial accuracy in memory
581 While aphantasic participants show an impairment in memory for object 
582 information, do they also show an impairment in spatial placement of the objects? To 
583 test this question, AMT workers (N=5 per object) drew an ellipse around the drawn 
584 version of each object, allowing us to quantify the size and location accuracy of each 
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585 drawn object (Fig. 5). When drawing from memory, there was no significant difference 
586 between groups in object location error in the x-direction (aphantasic: M pixel 
587 error=63.86, SD=31.59; control: M=60.63, SD=28.45; t(111)=0.57, p=0.572) nor the y-
588 direction (aphantasic: M=65.43, SD=29.89; control: M=69.10, SD=29.72; t(111)=0.65, 
589 p=0.515). However, this lack of difference was not due to difficulty in spatial accuracy; 
590 both groups’ drawings were highly spatially accurate, with all average errors in location 
591 less than 10% of the size of the images themselves. Similarly, there was also no 
592 significant difference in drawn object size error in terms of width (aphantasic: M pixel 
593 error=23.00, SD=10.95; control: M=24.89, SD=13.58; t(111)=0.82, p=0.413) and height 
594 (aphantasic: M=26.75; SD=14.15; control: M=22.82; SD=11.05; t(111)=1.62, p=0.107), 
595 and these sizes were highly accurate in both groups (average errors less than 4% of the 
596 image size). There was no correlation between a participant’s level of object location or 
597 size error and ratings on the OSIQ spatial questions (all p>0.30). In all, these results 
598 show that both aphantasic and control participants have highly accurate memories for 




Average object locations for memory drawings
602 Figure 5. Average object locations and sizes recalled by aphantasics and controls. Average 
603 object locations and sizes for memory drawings of four of the main objects from each image, made 
604 by aphantasic participants (solid lines) and control participants (dashed lines). Even though these 
605 objects were drawn from memory, their location and size accuracy was still very high. Importantly, 





610 3.5 Aphantasics draw fewer false objects than controls
611 Finally, we quantified the amount of error in participants’ drawings from memory 
612 by group. AMT workers (N=5 per drawing) viewed a drawing and its corresponding 
613 image and wrote down all objects in the drawings that were not present in the original 
614 image (essentially quantifying false object memories). Significantly more memory 
615 drawings by controls contained false objects than drawings by aphantasic participants 
616 (control: 14 drawings, aphantasic: 3 drawings; Pearson chi-square test: χ2=9.35, 
617 p=0.002, φ=0.18); examples can be seen in Fig. 6. This is not just because controls 
618 drew more objects overall and were thus more likely to draw false objects. If we also 
619 look at proportion of total objects drawn by each group that were false objects, 
620 significantly more objects drawn by controls were false objects than those drawn by 
621 aphantasic participants (χ2=6.37, p=0.012, φ=0.06). This indicates that control 
622 participants were making more memory errors, even after controlling for the fewer 
623 number of objects drawn overall by aphantasic participants. Interestingly, all aphantasic 
624 errors (see Fig. 6) were transpositions from another image and drawn in the correct 
625 location as the original object (a tree from the bedroom to the living room, a window 
626 from the kitchen to the living room, and a ceiling fan from the kitchen to the bedroom). In 
627 contrast, several false memories from controls were objects that did not exist across 
628 any image but instead appeared to be filled in based on the scene category (e.g., a 
629 piano in the living room, a dresser in the bedroom, logs in the living room). No 
630 perception drawings by participants from either group contained false objects.
631 As another metric of memory error, we also coded whether a drawing was edited 
632 or not, based on tracked mouse movements. A drawing was scored as edited if at least 
633 one line was drawn and then erased during the drawing. Significantly more memory 
634 drawings by control participants had editing than those by aphantasic participants 
635 (aphantasic: 28.4%, control: 46.6%; χ2=10.72, p=0.0011, φ=0.19). There was no 
636 significant difference in editing between groups for the perception drawings (aphantasic: 
637 37.6%, control: 47.7%; χ2=3.17, p=0.075), indicating these differences are likely not due 










(3/176 drawings with errors)Original Image
640 Figure 6. False object memories in the drawings. Examples of the false object memories made 
641 by participants in their memory drawings, with the inaccurate objects circled. Control participants 
642 made significantly more errors, with only 3 out of 176 total aphantasic drawings containing a falsely 





648 Through a drawing task with a large online sample, we conducted an in-depth 
649 characterization of memory and perceptual drawings of real-world scenes made by 
650 individuals with aphantasia, who self-report the inability to form voluntary visual 
651 imagery. We discover that aphantasic participants show impairments in object memory, 
652 drawing fewer objects, containing less color, and spending less time drawing each 
653 object. Further, we find evidence for greater dependence on symbolic information in the 
654 task, with more text in their drawings and common self-reporting of verbal strategies. 
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655 However, aphantasic participants show no impairments in spatial memory, positioning 
656 objects at accurate locations with the correct sizes. Further, aphantasic participants 
657 show significantly fewer errors in memory, with fewer falsely recalled objects, and less 
658 correction of their drawings. Importantly, we observe no significant differences between 
659 control and aphantasic participants when drawing directly from an image, indicating 
660 these differences are specific to memory and not driven by differences in effort, drawing 
661 ability, or perceptual processing. Indeed, aphantasic participants reported an equal 
662 confidence in their art abilities compared to controls, and many had experience with art 
663 classes and art-based careers.
664 Collectively, these results point to a dissociation in imagery between object-
665 based information and spatial information. In addition to selective deficits in object 
666 memory over spatial memory, aphantasic participants subjectively report weaker object 
667 imagery compared to spatial imagery in the OSIQ. This supports subjective self-report 
668 of intact spatial imagery in the smaller dataset (N=15) of Keogh & Pearson (2017), 
669 which first reported differences in OSIQ measures and have since been replicated 
670 (Dawes et al., 2020). Further, in the current study, participants’ self-reported object 
671 imagery abilities correlated with the number of objects they drew from memory. These 
672 consistent results both confirm the OSIQ as a meaningful measure, while also 
673 demonstrating how such deficits can be captured by a behavioral measure such as 
674 drawing. While a similar dissociation between object and spatial memory has been 
675 observed in other paradigms and populations (Farah & Hammond, 1988), the current 
676 study provides further evidence for this dissociation.  Cognitive decline from aging and 
677 dementia have shown selective deficits in object identification versus object localization 
678 (Reagh et al., 2016), owing to changes in the medial temporal lobe, where the perirhinal 
679 cortex is thought to contribute to object detail recollection, while the parahippocampal 
680 cortex contributes to scene detail recollection (Staresina, Duncan, & Davachi, 2011). 
681 The neocortex is also considered to be organized along separate visual processing 
682 pathways, with ventral regions primarily coding information about visual features, and 
683 parietal regions coding spatial information (Farah, Hammond, Levine, & Calvanio, 1988; 
684 Ungerleider & Haxby, 1994; Corballis, 1997; Carlesimo, Perri, Turriziani, Tomaiuolo, & 
685 Caltagirone, 2001; Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, & Mishkin, 2011). These findings also 
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686 suggest interesting parallels between the imagery experience of individuals with 
687 aphantasia and individuals who are congenitally blind, who perform similarly to typically 
688 sighted individuals on a variety of spatial imagery tasks (Kerr, 1983; Zimler & Keenan, 
689 1983; Eardley & Pring, 2007; Cattaneo et al., 2008), suggesting that they utilize spatial 
690 representations in the absence of visual representations of the stimuli. This may be the 
691 same for individuals with aphantasia who use spatial representations (i.e., spatial 
692 imagery), despite the absence of visual memory representations of these scenes. 
693 Neuroimaging of individuals with aphantasia will be an important next step, to see 
694 whether these impairments manifest in decreased volume or connectivity of regions 
695 specific to the imagery of visual details, such as anterior regions within inferotemporal 
696 cortex (Ishai et al., 2000; O’Craven & Kanwisher, 2000; Lee et al., 2012; Bainbridge et 
697 al., 2020) or medial parietal regions implicated in memory recall (Buckner, Andrews-
698 Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Vilberg & Rugg, 2008; Ranganath & Ritchey, 2012; Silson et 
699 al., 2019).
700 Further investigations into aphantasia will also provide critical insight to the 
701 nature of imagery, and how it compares to different forms of memory. While aphantasic 
702 participants show an impairment during recall performance, no evidence has shown 
703 impairments in visual recognition, supporting converging evidence towards a neural 
704 dissociation in the processes of quick, automatic visual recognition and slower, 
705 elaborative visual recall (Jacoby, 1991; Holdstock et al., 2002; Staresina & Davachi, 
706 2006; Barbeau, Pariente, Felician, & Puel, 2011; Bainbridge et al., 2019). That being 
707 said, the recognition task in the current experiment had low difficulty, testing foil images 
708 of the same semantic category, but without other matched detail (e.g., identities of 
709 objects). Future work could study whether individuals with aphantasia are impaired at 
710 more fine-grained recognition tasks, where object and spatial detail within an image are 
711 selectively manipulated. Aphantasic participants also report fully intact verbal recall 
712 abilities, and our results suggest that they may be using symbolic strategies (i.e., 
713 representing information through a symbolic or verbal code), in combination with 
714 accurate spatial representations, to compensate for their lack of visual imagery. In fact, 
715 in the current study, aphantasic participants’ drawings from memory contained more 
716 text than those of control participants, potentially indicating a verbal coding of their 
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717 memories to perform the task. Imagery of a visual stimulus thus may not necessarily be 
718 visual in nature; while forming a visual representation of the scene or object may be one 
719 way to undertake the task, there may be other, non-visual strategies to complete the 
720 task. Even in neurotypical adults, imagery-based representations in the brain may differ 
721 from perceptual representations of the same items (Winlove et al., 2018; Bainbridge et 
722 al., 2020). This contrasts with sensory reinstatement accounts proposing that the same 
723 neurons code both perception and imagery stimulus representations (e.g., Johnson & 
724 Johnson, 2014; Schultz et al., 2019). Further neuroimaging investigations will lead to an 
725 understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying these different strategies. The 
726 current study also grouped non-aphantasics into a single group, although the opposite 
727 experience of hyperphantasia (highly detailed photographic visual imagery) may be an 
728 equally important variation of experience to test. In a recent study, individuals with 
729 hyperphantasia performed significantly more accurately than aphantasic participants 
730 within a behavioural task suggested to involve object imagery, with no differences in 
731 performance evident between aphantasic and neurotypical control participants who had 
732 mid-range VVIQ scores (Milton et al; Unpublished Results). In the current study, one 
733 participant scored 76 on the VVIQ (which falls within the proposed cut-off for 
734 hyperphantasia, Zeman et al., 2020), but a larger sample will be needed for a more in-
735 depth investigation to examine between these imagery extremes. Further, drawing may 
736 be a potentially sensitive behavioral tool for examining visual memory representations 
737 within individuals across the visual imagery vividness spectrum. It is also possible that 
738 the current study contained both participants with congenital aphantasia and 
739 participants with acquired aphantasia. However, given that acquired aphantasia is rare 
740 (see Zeman et al., 2010), and that congenital aphantasia is thought to be experienced 
741 by approximately 2% of the population (Zeman et al., 2015), we would expect the 
742 majority of participants in this study experienced aphantasia that was congenital in 
743 nature.
744 Further, aphantasic participants exhibited lower errors in memory (e.g., fewer 
745 falsely recalled objects compared to controls), which could possibly reflect higher 
746 accuracy in symbolic memory versus controls, to compensate for visual memory 
747 difficulties. Individuals with aphantasia may serve as an ideal group to probe the 
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748 difference between visual and verbal memory and their interaction in both behavior and 
749 the brain. Additionally, while aphantasia has thus far only been quantified in the visual 
750 domain, preliminary work suggests that the experience may extend to other modalities 
751 (Zeman et al., 2015; Dawes et al., 2020; Zeman et al., 2020;). Using a multimodal 
752 approach, researchers may be able to pinpoint neural differences in aphantasia across 
753 other sensory modalities, for instance, the auditory domain which has been shown to 
754 have several characteristics similar to the visual domain (Halpern, 1988; Clarke, 
755 Bellmann, Meuli, Assal, & Steck, 2000; Bunzeck, Wuestenberg, Lutz, Heinze, & Jancke, 
756 2005).
757 Finally, these results serve as essential evidence to suggest that aphantasia is a 
758 valid experience, at least in part, defined by the inability to form voluntary visual images 
759 with a selective impairment in object imagery. It was proposed by some researchers 
760 that aphantasia may be more psychogenic and metacognitive, rather than neurogenic 
761 and perceptual (de Vito & Bortolomeo, 2016) However, differences in self-report on 
762 imagery measures (e.g. Dawes et al., 2020; Zeman et al., 2020) and objective 
763 measures (e.g. Keogh & Pearson 2017; Wicken et al., Unpublished Results) between 
764 individuals with aphantasia and typical imagery are well established within a number of 
765 studies. In the current study, we observe evidence for a selective impairment in object 
766 imagery for aphantasic participants compared to controls. Importantly, if the source of 
767 such an impairment was metacognitive, we would expect decreased performance in 
768 spatial accuracy, decreased performance in the perceptual drawing task, or low ratings 
769 in all questions of the OSIQ rather than solely the object imagery component. However, 
770 in all of these cases, aphantasic participants performed identically with controls. In fact, 
771 aphantasic participants even showed higher memory precision than control participants 
772 on some measures, including significantly fewer memory errors and fewer editing in 
773 their drawings. Further, the correlations between the VVIQ, OSIQ, and drawn object 
774 information lend validity to the self-reported questionnaires in capturing true behavioral 
775 deficits. This being said, while we observed a deficit in object memory for aphantasic 
776 participants, it was not a complete elimination of object memory abilities. Aphantasic 
777 participants were still able to draw five objects per image from memory. While this 
778 moderate performance could be due to some preserved ability at object memory, this 
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779 performance could also reflect the use of verbal lists of objects combined with intact, 
780 accurate spatial memory to reconstruct a scene (see Dawes et al., 2020). Future work 
781 will need to directly compare visual and verbal strategies, and push the limits to see 
782 what occurs when there is more visual detail than can be supported by verbal 
783 strategies.
784 In conclusion, leveraging the wide reach of the internet, we have conducted an 
785 in-depth and large scale study of the nature of aphantasics’ mental representations for 
786 visual images. In so doing, we have provided an important experimental validation for 
787 the differing imagery experiences reported by individuals with aphantasia. These 
788 individuals have a unique mental experience that can provide essential insights into the 
789 nature of imagery, memory, and perception. The drawings provided by aphantasic 
790 participants reveal a complex, nuanced story that show impaired object memory, but 
791 intact verbal and spatial memory during recall of real-world scene images. Collectively, 
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